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 Enceladus, a moon of Saturn, has geyser-like jets that 
spray plumes of material into orbit. These jets could 
enable a free-flying spacecraft to collect samples and 
return them to Earth for study to determine if they contain 
the building blocks of life. The Office of Planetary 
Protection at NASA requires containment of any 
unsterilized samples and prohibits destructive impact of 
the spacecraft upon return to Earth, with a sample release 
probability of less than 1 in 1,000,000 as a recommended 
goal.  
 This paper describes a probabilistic risk assessment 
model that uses dynamic simulation techniques to capture 
the physics-based, time- and state-dependent interactions 
between the sample return system and the environment, 
which drive the risk of sample release. The dynamic 
approach uses a Monte Carlo-style simulation to 
integrate the many phases and sources of risk for a 
sample return mission.  
 The model is used to assess the achievability of the 
planetary protection reliability goal. This is accomplished 
by performing sensitivity studies assessing the impact of 
modeling assumptions to identify where uncertainties 
drive the risk. These results, in turn, are used to examine 
the feasibility of meeting key design and performance 
parameters that are needed to achieve the reliability goal 
for a given architecture with existing technologies. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Discovering a second genesis of life outside of 
Earth’s biosphere would have profound impacts on our 
understanding of biology and our place in the universe. 
Within the solar system, there are multiple locations that 
may have once had or may still harbor life. One potential 
location is Enceladus, the sixth largest moon of Saturn. 
Enceladus is a prime candidate to support life as it shows 
evidence of internal heat and a large ocean beneath an icy 
shell. In 2005, the Cassini spacecraft discovered that 
Enceladus has geyser-like jets spraying into orbit around 
Saturn, making up the E ring. The jets contain water, CO2, 
CO, CH4, NH3, and Ar, as well as evidence of other more 
complex organic molecules1. These geysers could enable 
a free-flying spacecraft to collect samples of compounds 
found on Enceladus without needing to land on the 
surface, greatly simplifying the equipment required to 
return samples to Earth for study. 
Returning samples to Earth for study allows 
independent and repeatable studies to be performed by 
multiple scientists with varying techniques and 
instruments, many of which would be impractical in 
space. Furthermore, sample studies performed on Earth 
can take advantage of the latest state-of-the-art techniques 
available, and new techniques can be developed and 
applied based upon preliminary results2.  
The Office of Planetary Protection (OPP) at the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
is responsible for ensuring that space missions take 
prudent precautions to protect Earth’s biosphere from 
biological threats that may exist in samples brought back 
from space. The OPP prohibits destructive impact upon 
return of a spacecraft and requires highly reliable 
containment of unsterilized samples. This requirement has 
been interpreted to state that the chance of releasing an 
unsterilized sample into Earth’s biosphere on a reentry 
attempt should be less than 1 in 1,000,000 (Ref. 3).  
Despite the lack of an existing Enceladus Sample 
Return Mission (ESRM), the achievability of this 
ambitious planetary protection reliability goal is studied 
through analysis of a representative architecture. This 
study seeks to identify key assumptions and uncertainties 
that drive risk, while determining design and performance 
parameters necessary to achieve the planetary protection 
reliability goal. A Monte Carlo-style probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) model has been created using dynamic 
simulation techniques to capture the physics-based, time- 
and state-dependent interactions between the sample 
return system and the environment.  
While many phases of an ESRM could be modeled 
with more traditional, static PRA approaches, a 
simulation approach greatly facilitates the modeling of the 
highly dynamic entry, descent, and landing (EDL) phase, 
when the potential for sample release is most critical. A 
simulation approach is advantageous because it naturally 
and accurately accounts for the highly coupled stochastic 
characteristics of the environment, the performance of the 
system in a potentially degraded state, and the complex 
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temporal interactions involved—all of which can 
dramatically alter the eventual outcome of the mission. 
In previous study of the feasibility of a Mars Sample 
Return (MSR) architecture, an ambitious set of reliability 
goals for Earth Entry Vehicle (EEV) functionality were 
proposed. The goals, if met, would ostensibly assure that 
the risk of Loss of Containment Assurance (LOCA) of 
unsterilized samples would meet the planetary protection 
reliability goal4. This present ESRM risk study expands 
upon the previous MSR efforts and examines the 
achievability of its proposed reliability goals in order to 
produce a preliminary risk scoping assessment of the 
ESRM concept. To accomplish this, we developed a 
model framework that can capture the dependencies 
between the risk of loss of mission (LOM) and the risk of 
LOCA, which is a subset of LOM.  
 
II. ENCELADUS SAMPLE RETURN MISSION  
 
As there is currently no complete ESRM architecture 
available and the design details needed to build a PRA 
model are absent, this paper focuses on the development 
of the risk assessment approach that will support the 
design, development, testing, and evaluation of potential 
future mission concepts. However, multiple, high-level 
mission architectures have been developed by the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of 
Technology, under contract from NASA2,5. In addition, 
design details from similar phases of an MSR mission6 
have been adopted in the present work. Based upon this 
previous work, a generic ESRM architecture has been 
synthesized to begin developing a dynamic PRA model. 
Figure 1 shows the ESRM phases and durations. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Major ESRM phases and durations, including 
Earth targeting maneuver (ETM), entry, descent and 
landing (EDL) and sample return facility (SRF). 
 
The mission begins with the launch of the probe. The 
probe consists of an EEV protectively housed within a 
micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shield, along 
with a main satellite bus that provides command and data 
handling (C&DH), electrical power system (EPS), 
propulsion (PROP), communications (COMM), and 
guidance, navigation and control (GNC). The EEV 
contains the necessary equipment and mechanisms to 
collect samples of the geyser plumes and contain them 
until retrieved by scientists on Earth. Figure 2 shows the 
axisymmetric geometry adopted for this analysis based 
upon the MSR EEV4. 
The probe will perform several planetary fly-by 
maneuvers around Venus, Earth, and Jupiter in order to 
gain additional energy, and will arrive at Saturn eight 
years after launch. The probe will then enter Saturn orbit 
and perform several “pump-down” fly-by maneuvers 
around Saturn’s moons to reduce its energy in a non-
propulsive fashion. The spacecraft will spend the next 
year sampling the geysers of Enceladus and performing 
other in situ research. To leave Saturn orbit and return to 
Earth, the spacecraft performs several “pump-up” fly-by 
maneuvers around several moons in order to gain energy.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Axisymmetric EEV geometry. 
 
Approximately four and a half years later, the 
spacecraft will be prepared to perform the Earth targeting 
maneuver (ETM). The ETM serves as the final commit-
to-return point of the mission. If containment breach is 
suspected and this maneuver is not completed, then the 
spacecraft will enter a relatively safe heliocentric orbit to 
prevent the possible contamination of Earth’s biosphere. 
Once the spacecraft is four days away from Earth, the 
ETM is performed if the spacecraft bus and EEV have 
passed final status checks and the MMOD shield has been 
successfully separated from the spacecraft. The spacecraft 
bus will use the main engine to place the EEV on a 
ballistic trajectory to land passively at the Utah Test and 
Training Range (UTTR). After a successful engine burn, 
the spacecraft bus will spin-eject the EEV, and then 
perform a subsequent propulsive burn to place itself in a 
safe heliocentric orbit.  
Given the initial state of the vehicle at separation, the 
EEV will passively fall to the Earth for the next four days 
until reaching the entry interface (EI) with the upper 
atmosphere. During this free-flight, the EEV’s now 
exposed thermal protection system (TPS) will accrue risk 
from MMOD threats. Absent a specific, detailed ESRM 
architecture, assumptions about the EEV conditions at EI 
have been made based upon existing missions and 
analyses. Table I shows the assumed nominal mission 
conditions at EI adopted from the Stardust mission7 and 
the MSR mission4. 
 
TABLE I. EI Conditions. 
Parameter Value 
Velocity 16 km/s 
Azimuth 102.9 deg 
Flight Path Angle -7.7 deg 
Altitude 121.92 km 
Longitude -123.67454 deg 
Latitude 42.60499 deg 
Mass 39.9 kg 
 
The EEV will then perform EDL, relying on the TPS 
to protect its structure from the intense heat of 
atmospheric entry. This heat must effectively sterilize the 
entire exterior of the EEV4. As the EEV is subjected to 
the dynamic pressure of the atmosphere, the vehicle must 
maintain integrity, which is sensitive to the temperature of 
the underlying structure.  
Unlike previous sample return missions, the EEV 
does not rely on a parachute to further decelerate the 
vehicle. It will impact the UTTR at some final position, 
which is a function of the initial state at release from the 
spacecraft bus and the specific interaction with the 
atmospheric conditions encountered, including winds 
aloft.  
Finally, the EEV is retrieved by the awaiting 
recovery team and carefully transported to a sample return 
facility (SRF). The SRF must provide an environment that 
combines the capabilities of a Bio-Safety Level-4 facility8 
to contain the samples and avoid LOCA, and the 
capabilities of the Lunar Material Processing Facility, 
which is designed to prevent LOM due to contamination 
of the sample with terrestrial matter. 
 
III. RISK MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
A dynamic risk model is implemented in a Monte 
Carlo-style framework and follows an approach similar to 
previous efforts by the Engineering Risk Assessment 
team at NASA Ames Research Center9. This dynamic 
approach allows for complete system state information to 
be propagated through the entire mission, from launch to 
EEV processing at an SRF. The model begins by 
considering the risk of a launch vehicle failure based upon 
a generic launch vehicle10. Next, the reliabilities of the 
various spacecraft subsystems are tracked over time, 
along with the time-varying environmental and MMOD 
hazards faced by the spacecraft. Prior to arrival at Saturn, 
any critical loss of spacecraft functionality leads to a 
LOM.  
Once the spacecraft begins collecting samples of the 
Enceladus geysers, a series of mechanisms must function 
properly and in situ measurements can begin. Any 
complete loss of spacecraft functionality at this point in 
the mission leads to a LOM, in which some in situ science 
has been performed. Dynamic risk models allow for the 
exact time LOM occurs to impact the utility produced by 
the mission. 
Until the spacecraft is able to perform the ETM, there 
is no risk of LOCA. Up until this point in the mission, the 
modeling approach remains somewhat static, comprised 
of traditional component reliabilities with the addition of 
MMOD damage to the probe and the EEV TPS, which 
can be somewhat dynamic if modeled in detail. It is 
assumed that the EEV TPS is well protected up to this 
point by the MMOD shielding provided by the spacecraft 
bus, and that the ETM would not occur if any damage to 
the TPS is detected. If the ETM fails to occur or the 
mission is aborted, the risk of LOCA remains zero and a 
LOM occurs.  
Once the ETM is attempted, there are potential 
mission end states that could lead to a LOCA, a LOM, or 
a successful mission. After the ETM is attempted, the 
phenomena that drive the risk of both LOCA and LOM 
are now highly time- and state-dependent, physics-based 
interactions of the system and environment. Once the 
ETM is complete and EEV separation has occurred, the 
spacecraft bus performs an additional burn to avoid 
returning to Earth. Failure of this burn is assumed to 
result in LOCA.  
During the four-day cruise to Earth after the ETM, 
any significant damage to the TPS could result in LOCA, 
since the system is then on a passive, ballistic trajectory to 
the UTTR landing site. To capture this source of risk, an 
MMOD flux model must be used in conjunction with the 
cross-sectional area of the EEV. Currently, the risk of 
MMOD damage to the satellite bus and EEV TPS is based 
on the MSR analysis6, which only accounts for 
catastrophic failures leading to LOM. Thus, the present 
model assumes that the EEV TPS begins EI in a non-
damaged state. 
The initial position and velocity of the EEV are 
propagated to EI using OTIS11, a trajectory optimization 
code. OTIS produces a predicted landing point utilizing 
the 1976 standard atmosphere model12. Figure 3 shows 
the geocentric spherical and vehicle coordinate systems 
used in OTIS. 
For OTIS to propagate the EEV trajectory to the 
UTTR, estimates for EEV drag as a function of velocity 
are necessary. These estimates were obtained from 
computational fluid dynamics analyses, which were 
performed with CART3D13 for speeds below Mach 1.2 
and with CBAERO14 for Mach 1.2 and above on the EEV 
geometry (Figure 2). Figure 4 shows an example of output 
from CART3D at Mach 0.7.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Spherical coordinate system with the Earth at the 
origin point O and the EEV point A at ETM. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Example pressure field output from CART3D for 
Mach = 0.7 and angle of attack = 0 degrees. 
 
In addition to the velocity dependence of supersonic 
and hypersonic drag, CBAERO is also used to predict the 
aero-thermodynamic environment on selected body points 
of the EEV, based on the flow conditions at each OTIS 
trajectory time step. Figure 5 shows an example of surface 
heating output from CBAERO for a speed of Mach 45, 
which is typical of early Earth entry for this mission.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Example output of convective heating from 
CBAERO for Mach = 45, angle of attack = 0 degrees, and 
pressure = 0.5 bars. 
The thermal environments produced by CBAERO are 
then used in a one-dimensional heating code, FIAT15, to 
evaluate the response of the EEV TPS. FIAT is used to 
assess the particular TPS stack-up at the selected body 
points—i.e., the aerodynamic stagnation point and the 
point on the back shell that experiences the minimum 
surface temperature on the vehicle—and produce a time-
history of the bondline temperature (BLT) at the interface 
between the TPS and the spacecraft structure. The stack-
up adopted in the present study is identical to that of the 
MSR design, but with an increased total thickness, 
consisting of 3.05 cm of carbon phenolic16,17, which is 
assumed to be at 233 K at EI. The model does not 
consider uncertainties in the initial temperature of the 
EEV TPS. The current model also assumes the TPS will 
be functionally reliable and does not take into account 
potential failures modes of this particular TPS stack-up, 
as they are highly design-specific and are beyond the 
scope of this study. Figures 6 and 7 show examples of 
FIAT time-history outputs for the nominal case at the 
aerodynamic stagnation point on the heat shield, which 
experiences the greatest surface and bondline 
temperatures, and at the point on the back shell that 
experiences the lowest maximum surface temperature. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Example FIAT output of temperature histories at 
the stagnation point for nominal mission conditions. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Example FIAT output of temperature histories on a 
back-shell point for nominal mission conditions. 
To determine the outcome of the mission during the 
EDL phase in each Monte Carlo realization, outputs from 
these physics-based simulations are compared to several 
failure criteria. As an initial assumption in the PRA 
model, four simple failure criteria have been selected to 
produce estimates of LOCA probabilities from the 
physical analysis. Table II shows the baseline failure 
thresholds that will trigger a LOCA or LOM if violated. 
The model does not include either the risk of LOCA after 
a successful landing or the risk of LOM due to the sample 
being destroyed by excessive heat after landing. 
 
TABLE II. Baseline failure thresholds. 
Threshold Value Event Triggers 
Sterilization Surface 
Temperature 
398 K - 
773 K 
Does Not 
Exceed 
LOCA 
Structural Failure 
Temperature at MaxQ  
520 K Exceeds LOCA 
Structural Failure 
Temperature at Landing  
520 K Exceeds LOCA 
Structural Failure due to 
Landing Error 
84 km Exceeds LOCA 
Internal Self-Sterilization 
Temperature 
746 K Exceeds LOM 
 
The model assumes that the entire exterior surface of 
the EEV is contaminated during sample collection. 
Therefore, a LOCA will occur on a particular realization 
if the lowest of the maximum surface temperatures is not 
sufficient to sterilize the craft. The sterilization surface 
temperature value is assumed to be 398 K, based upon 
planetary protection procedures for the Viking mission18. 
However, as this value does not account for the duration 
of the temperature exposure, a more stringent procedure 
requiring 773 K for at least 0.5 seconds is also applied to 
investigate sensitivity to this parameter18. 
If the maximum BLT at touchdown is above 520 K, 
then it is assumed that a structural failure occurs on 
impact and results in a LOCA. Similarly, if the maximum 
BLT at maximum dynamic pressure (MaxQ) is above 
520 K, then it is assumed that aerodynamic forces fail the 
structure and cause LOCA. This threshold value is based 
upon the maximum BLT of the MSR design4. 
If the touchdown location is outside of the UTTR 
region, which is assumed to be 100% soft clay or sand, 
then the EEV is lost or a structural failure due to landing 
on a hard surface occurs and results in LOCA. The 
amount of landing error distance beyond which structural 
failure occurs is assumed to be 84 km, based upon the 
Genesis mission19. 
Additionally, the model assumes that the EEV will 
have an internal self-sterilization functionality to avoid 
LOCA and instead only cause a LOM. This functionality 
is passively activated if any portion of the EEV TPS BLT 
reaches the internal self-sterilization threshold 
temperature before landing. In such an event, a thermite 
mixture would be ignited, creating a plasma that would 
effectively sterilize the sample. The internal self-
sterilization threshold value is assumed to be 746 K, 
which is the auto-ignition temperature of thermite. It is 
also assumed that if this functionality is activated, then 
surface sterilization has also occurred. 
Finally, the risk associated with transport to the SRF 
and activities at the SRF must be taken into account. The 
present model tracks this risk of LOCA as 10–7, which is 
based upon the MSR analysis4. However, it does not 
consider the risk to individuals working within the SRF or 
the risk of LOM due to the contained sample becoming 
contaminated by terrestrial matter. 
The possible end states of the model are summarized 
in the diagram shown in Figure 8. The diagram highlights 
the interplay between the risk of LOCA, the risk of LOM, 
and mission success based upon key design and 
performance parameters.  
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Conceptual diagram of the interplay between 
design parameters, failure thresholds, and the risks of both 
LOCA and LOM. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
The model was used to produce results based upon 
nominal ETM conditions, which were calculated such that 
ballistic propagation from ETM leads to the EI conditions 
in Table II, including dispersions. The baseline 
dispersions used for each parameter at the ETM and 
during EDL are based upon data from previous missions 
and analyses4,7,20 and are shown in Table III.  
TABLE III. Baseline parameter dispersions. 
Parameter Range 
Radial Velocity [er] ±0.1% 
Theta Velocity [eθ] ±0.1% 
Phi Velocity [eφ] ±0.1% 
Radial Distance [r] ±0.1% 
Theta [θ] ±0.075 deg 
Phi [φ] ±0.075 deg 
Mass ±0.75 kg 
Drag Uncertainty ±10% 
Convective Heating 100% – 170% 
Radiative Heating 100% – 250% 
TPS Density ±4% 
TPS Heating Coefficient ±5% 
TPS Conductivity ±5% 
 
Nominal mission results are produced and examined 
to establish the connection between mission success and 
meeting the planetary protection reliability goal. 
Sensitivities to dispersion parameters are studied to 
provide insight into what drives the risk of each failure 
threshold. The sensitivity of the failure probability 
estimates to the risk-driving thresholds is then 
investigated. These sensitivity results are then used to 
examine whether a given architecture could feasibly meet 
the key design and performance parameters needed to 
achieve the reliability goal using existing technologies.  
 
IV.A. Nominal Results for LOM and LOCA 
 
Nominal results (i.e., results for a nominal mission 
without parameters dispersions) indicate that a successful 
sample return is likely, given a fully functional bus and 
undamaged EEV at ETM. A nominal mission will incur 
only LOCA risk from the SRF. Figure 9 shows the 
nominal results. These results only include risk of LOM 
stemming from hardware unreliability and MMOD and 
LOCA risk from the SRF, which meets the planetary 
protection reliability goal. These estimates have been 
produced by only considering key components identified 
in previous studies5 and assuming minimal redundancy. 
These components are exposed to dormant failure rates21 
for the entire 13.5-year mission duration. 
Results that include baseline parameter dispersions 
were produced by assuming a uniform distribution for all 
parameters. Figure 10 shows the total LOM risk including 
the LOCA risk for the nominal mission with dispersions. 
These results indicate a very large number of failures due 
to the EEV entering Earth’s atmosphere at an excessively 
shallow entry angle and skipping back out into 
heliocentric orbit. While not a contributor to LOCA, this 
failure mode is a significant contributor to LOM. 
Figure 11 shows the risk results for LOCA with 
dispersions included. As the bounds and distribution of 
these dispersions are conservative and do not do reflect an 
actual design, the corresponding probabilistic estimates 
are also conservative. However, these results do indicate 
how the baseline parameters should be enhanced to 
achieve the planetary protection reliability goal. The 
indicated enhancements are to increase TPS thickness to 
reduce the BLT at landing, or to refine the criteria for 
structural failure on landing, based on the qualities of the 
landing point and the strengths of the structure at the 
maximum BLT at landing.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Risk of LOM for nominal mission without 
dispersions. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Risk of LOM with dispersions and baseline 
failure thresholds. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Risk of LOCA with dispersions and baseline 
failure thresholds. 
The nominal results with the initial assumptions do 
not meet the planetary protection reliability goal. Thus, 
additional model refinement is required to further 
investigate the risk-driving sources of design and 
performance uncertainty included in the model. Better 
understanding of this uncertainty will aid in determining 
whether the model is overly conservative or the planetary 
protection goal itself is not achievable with current 
technology. 
 
IV.B. Sensitivity at Earth Target Maneuver 
 
Sensitivity sweeps beyond the baseline dispersion 
limits, centered about the nominal values, were modeled 
by varying a single parameter at a time. This aids in 
understanding which dispersion parameters drive the 
LOCA risk and require enhancement to meet the 
planetary protection reliability goal, and which 
parameters can be left as conservative placeholders 
without impacting the results. Results are displayed 
relative to the baseline threshold value for each failure 
parameter. Parameters below 100% indicate a successful 
outcome, except for Minimum Surface temperature, 
which must be above 100% for a successful outcome to 
occur. This demonstrates the impact each dispersion 
parameter has on the available threshold margin. 
Sensitivities of the failure parameters to radial velocity 
and theta velocity at ETM are presented here. All other 
dispersion parameters in Table III were also investigated. 
Aside from Phi Velocity, which produced similar results 
to those presented, the dispersion parameters not 
discussed here did not affect failure probability. 
Figure 12 shows the sensitivity of the four LOCA 
failure parameters to the radial velocity after the ETM. If 
the radial velocity falls below -11.92 km/s, the EEV will 
skip out of the Earth’s atmosphere and enter heliocentric 
orbit instead of returning to Earth, which is assumed not 
to cause LOCA but does cause a LOM. These results 
indicate that the final landing point and the maximum 
BLT at landing are sensitive to the radial velocity. Thus, 
the performance of the GNC equipment and the EEV 
separation system mechanism will be vital to the success 
of the mission.  
 
 
Fig. 12. Sensitivity of LOCA failure criterion parameters 
to radial velocity at ETM. 
Figure 13 shows the sensitivity of the four LOCA 
failure parameters to theta velocity at the ETM, 
representing a pointing error after EEV separation. Again, 
landing error is extremely sensitive to this value, as is the 
maximum BLT at landing. This sensitivity demonstrates 
the importance of a properly aligned velocity vector upon 
EEV release. This further indicates the importance of a 
precise GNC sensing system, and that the EEV release 
mechanism must have very narrow dispersion about the 
imparted energy. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Sensitivity of LOCA failure criterion parameters 
to theta velocity at ETM. 
 
Overall, the results indicate that these dispersions at 
ETM drive the LOCA risk of landing error with some 
impact on the BLT at landing. The other thresholds are 
relatively insensitive to these dispersions. 
 
IV.D. Sensitivity During Entry, Descent, and Landing 
 
Figure 14 shows the sensitivity of the four LOCA 
failure parameters to uncertainty in the drag predictions 
used for the analysis, as a function of percentage of the 
nominal drag value. The results indicate that landing error 
is somewhat sensitive and drag error could impact results, 
depending on the specific state of the vehicle in a 
particular realization, but drag error alone is not enough to 
trigger a failure. In addition, the minimum surface 
temperature is slightly sensitive and the margin above the 
necessary sterilization temperature is reduced with 
increased drag error, but again, drag error alone is not 
enough to trigger a failure.  
 
 
Fig. 14. Sensitivity of LOCA failure criterion parameters 
to EDL drag predictions. 
Figure 15 shows the sensitivity of the four LOCA 
failure parameters to the convective heating uncertainty in 
FIAT, which represents an experimentally derived factor 
applied to the analytic prediction of convective heating. 
The parameter effectively amplifies the heat transfer from 
the environment to the surface. With an error factor of 
unity, the maximum BLT at landing threshold is just 
under 100%, leaving very little margin for increases in 
convective heating. 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Sensitivity of LOCA failure criterion parameters 
to convective heating uncertainty. 
 
The results show that both the landing error and 
maximum BLT at MaxQ are insensitive to this parameter. 
The minimum surface temperature is highly sensitive, but 
the predicted value increases with greater uncertainty in 
the heating estimate, further assuring that the surface will 
be sterilized. The maximum BLT at landing is also 
sensitive to this parameter and could increase the 
likelihood of failure without other parameter variations. 
These results indicate that reducing the uncertainty of the 
convective heating of the TPS would increase the 
estimated likelihood of mission success.  
Generally, the results indicate that minimum surface 
temperature and maximum BLT at landing are sensitive to 
the uncertainties during EDL, including the performance 
of the TPS. The maximum BLT at MaxQ and landing 
error are not sensitive to these parameters. 
 
IV.B. Sensitivity of LOCA Risk Driver Results 
 
The probabilities of LOM and LOCA are both 
heavily influenced by the assumed threshold values 
selected for each failure criterion parameter. While using 
failure threshold parameters is a valid approach to bound 
system risks, it effectively obfuscates the actual capability 
of the system to perform successfully. The threshold 
values are generally quite conservative because the 
analyses that produce them often stack worst-case 
assumptions on top of worst-case assumptions. A 
sensitivity study is performed to determine the degree to 
which each failure threshold must be relaxed to yield a 
LOCA probability of less than 1 in 1,000,000.  
Figure 16 shows the sensitivity of the LOCA 
probability results to the temperature threshold for 
structural failure at landing. This risk estimate benefits 
from the internal self-sterilization threshold BLT, which 
prevents LOCA if exceeded prior to landing. With 
increased BLT at landing, the likelihood of structural 
failure on impact increases due to the weakened state of 
the EEV. The processes by which the structure would fail 
are dependent upon the characteristics of the landing 
location and the state of the structure protecting the 
sample.  
 
 
Fig. 16. Sensitivity of LOCA risk estimates to the 
temperature threshold for structural failure at landing. 
 
To reduce the risk contribution of this threshold, the 
modeling assumptions that impact the BLT could be 
refined. However, since it is unlikely that the structure 
would be able to withstand temperatures up to 800 K, an 
increase in model fidelity is required to more precisely 
capture the physical interaction of the system structure 
with the physical properties of the specific landing site in 
each realization. By physically modelling the interaction 
of the system with the precise landing site, the failure 
threshold parameter can be removed, allowing the risk 
model to capture the inherent robustness of the design.  
Figure 17 shows the sensitivity of the LOCA 
probability to the landing error threshold. These results 
indicate that the baseline ETM dispersions are 
unacceptable and must be enhanced, given the extreme 
range of the landing errors (up to 450 km) that would 
have to be accommodated to effectively reduce this risk 
contribution.  
Figure 18 shows the sensitivity of LOCA probability 
to the minimum surface sterilization temperature 
threshold. The baseline peak value required to sterilize the 
vehicle is nominally set at 398 K, leading to zero 
probability of not successfully sterilizing the surface 
during the Monte Carlo simulation. Applying a 
pessimistic bound of 773 K, however, leads to a failure 
every time. This extreme sensitivity indicates the 
importance of understanding the EEV surface sterilization 
requirements. Moreover, the simple failure threshold 
criteria may prove to be too conservative and require a 
time-history of the physical process to determine whether 
a sterilization failure would occur. 
 
Fig. 17. Sensitivity of LOCA risk estimates to structural 
failure at landing due to landing error threshold. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Sensitivity of LOCA risk estimates to minimum 
surface temperature threshold for sterilization failure. 
 
Overall, these sensitivity results indicate that an 
extreme amount of relaxation of the constraints would be 
necessary to achieve the planetary protection reliability 
goal. Thus, exploring other avenues of risk reduction, 
such as reducing dispersions or increasing capabilities, is 
likely to be more successful. 
 
IV.E. Design and Performance Parameters Required 
to Achieve Planetary Protection Reliability Goal 
 
The sensitivity study results were used to create an 
enhanced, more representative set of performance 
parameter dispersions and an increased TPS thickness that 
together would meet the planetary protection reliability 
goal. The TPS thickness was increased by 34% from 3.05 
cm to 4.08 cm to address excessive BLT, due to 
uncertainties in TPS performance, causing structural 
failures at landing. This increased TPS thickness and 
enhanced set of model dispersions yielded zero failures in 
1.2 million Monte Carlo realizations using the baseline 
failure thresholds. Table IV gives the enhanced 
dispersions and the percentage by which they were 
modified relative to the baseline values. All other 
parameters were left at the baseline values. A normal 
distribution, with the parameter range as the three-sigma 
value, is used for all parameters at the ETM and log-
normal distributions are used for the EDL parameters. 
The enhanced parameter dispersions indicate that an 
order of magnitude improvement over the current state-
of-the-art would be necessary to meet the reliability goal, 
given the nominal failure threshold values. Such an 
improvement in the error in EEV state at ETM could 
prove to be extremely challenging, but could reasonably 
be considered possible with current technology. 
 
TABLE IV. Enhanced Parameter Dispersions. 
Parameter Range Relative 
Radial Velocity [er] ±0.01% 10% 
Theta Velocity [eθ] ±0.01% 10% 
Phi Velocity [eφ] ±0.01% 10% 
Radial Distance [r] ±0.01% 10% 
 
The required increase in TPS thickness necessary to 
meet the reliability goal with the nominal failure threshold 
values represents a potentially dramatic increase in EEV 
mass. Such a design enhancement would be extremely 
challenging, as the total TPS mass could grow to as high 
as 36.2 kg or 91% of the EEV mass. This would leave 
almost no mass available for mechanisms, structure, or 
payload. Moreover, such a thick carbon-phenolic TPS has 
never been flown by NASA and may introduce additional, 
unknown failure modes that are not currently included in 
this risk model. This indicates that, given the current 
modeling assumptions, the planetary protection reliability 
goal would be a challenge to achieve with current 
technology and could benefit from future TPS technology 
development. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results presented are driven in large part by the 
baseline dispersions of the parameters used by previous 
missions and the use of binary failure thresholds. The 
failure thresholds do not capture the full robustness of the 
design and do not lead to a reliability estimate that meets 
the planetary protection reliability goal with the baseline 
design and performance parameters. Reducing the 
parameter dispersions and increasing the robustness of the 
TPS design does lead to a system that meets the planetary 
protection reliability goal and shows that such a mission 
could be feasible. However, these design enhancements 
may not be achievable with current technology. 
Thus, the complexity of the model must be increased 
to more precisely determine the degree to which current 
performance and design expectations must be enhanced to 
meet the planetary protection reliability goal. This can be 
achieved by further coupling the existing simulations to 
include a physics-based model of structural response 
during landing. Including additional fidelity in the 
model’s dynamic framework will refine the conservative 
assumptions, produce a more accurate risk assessment, 
and better capture the inherent robustness of the design. 
Such a model could explore alternate concepts and 
assess their potential to meet the planetary protection 
reliability goal by giving the design team the ability to 
trade reductions in LOCA for increases in LOM using the 
available design and performance parameters—e.g., flight 
path angle, EEV shape, TPS stack-up, abort criterion, and 
self-sterilization BLT. For example, by tuning the 
nominal return trajectory and the response of the vehicle 
to increases in BLT, a less robust TPS design could be 
implemented with very narrow margins for a successful 
outcome. This narrow window of success would 
correspondingly shrink the very undesirable outcome of 
LOCA and would lead to a great many more missions that 
would end with internal self-sterilization or with the EEV 
skipping off of Earth’s atmosphere into heliocentric 
space.  
Ultimately, due to the extreme constraints placed 
upon the system to protect the Earth’s biosphere from 
sample release, risk-informed design should be 
implemented in an ESRM project as early as initial 
conception. Due to the highly time- and state-dependent 
interactions between the EEV and the environment, a 
dynamic, physics-based PRA should be employed in 
order to most accurately capture the key risk factors and 
produce results to guide and optimize the design. 
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